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Emotional Self-Alienation  
Thomas Szanto 
 
 
 
Abstract 
What is it like to feel alienated from one’s own emotions, or emotional self-alienation 
(ESA)? Drawing on work from critical sociology on emotional capitalism and the com-
modification of emotions as well as on analytic and phenomenological philosophy of 
emotions, here, I propose a multi-dimensional account of ESA. I begin by sketching a 
relational account of alienation, according to which alienation is a deficient relation to 
oneself, others and the world. Next, I show that ESA is not reducible to cognate but 
different phenomena such as feelings of being manipulated, coercion or self-deception. I 
then distinguish between three dimensions of emotions that are deficient in ESA: their 
experiential, self-disclosing and normative dimension. I argue that ESA involves, first, a 
certain cleavage between the affective and the intentional dimension of emotions. This 
results in the loss of personal import of one’s emotions and a failure to integrate a given 
emotion into one’s overall evaluative outlook. Secondly, I show that this goes hand in 
hand with a deficiency in the self-disclosing dimension of emotions. I suggest that in 
ESA emotions are not revelatory of what matters to oneself. Consequently, ESA ham-
pers an essential function of emotions, namely the elaboration of one’s overall personal 
evaluative outlook. Finally, I argue that ESA also negatively affects the normative dimen-
sion of emotions: it disrupts the balance between what I ought to feel and what I actually 
feel. I conclude by addressing potential misunderstandings of what emotional re-
appropriation is, and outline how a ‘critical theory of emotions’ might reply to them. 
 
 
 
1. Setting the Stage: Emotional Capitalism and ‘Emotion-Invasion’ 
 
Imagine you have worked for the communal unemployment agency for some 
years. You have professional training as a social worker; your friends consider you 
the most empathetic person they know. Though you don’t see yourself in such a 
positive light, attending to people in need was indeed always what mattered most 
to you. Accordingly, solidarity, sympathy and compassion were always built into 
the heart of your self-image. You not only cognitively and morally appraise these 
values, but they impact you in a way that the feelings attached to those values 
	 2 
themselves constitute values for you. Sympathy is not just an abstract value; the 
very feeling of sympathy matters to you. Now, imagine further that one day a 
young single mother arrives an hour too late for the scheduled job meeting. She 
desperately tries to explain the cause of her delay (due to issues at the kindergar-
ten). But you have repeatedly been told by your superior not to make any excep-
tions to attendance rules, and the monotony of endless interviews has not passed 
by you without leaving a mark of growing indifference. In the face of the moth-
er’s tears you shrug, tell her half-heartedly that you are sorry, and make a note in 
the respective file, effectuating that she loses a week’s allowance payment. How-
ever, before going to bed, the mother’s tearful face pops up in your mind; you 
feel uneasiness mounting and eventually overwhelming you. You murmur to 
yourself: ‘Just what have I become?! I don’t really feel sympathy any more… But 
that’s not me.’  
 What happens in this momentary or possibly life-changing crisis? What 
happens if it’s not so much your values or convictions that change but something 
in the very way they affect you? Suppose you still wholeheartedly hold on to all 
your previous values and convictions and, contrary to the above scenario, you do 
make an exception for the mother based on them. What changes, however, is 
how situations that you were deeply concerned with, cared about, don’t really 
impact you any more. The mother’s distress and tears may still bring you to act in 
certain ways, but they don’t move you. In this paper, I shall argue that part of what 
happens is that you become alienated from your emotions.  
 The very conceptual interface of ‘emotion’, ‘self’ and ‘alienation’, however, 
might already raise the eyebrows of different philosophical camps. For critical 
social philosophers, for example, it might seem problematic after decades of 
poststructuralist, feminist or critical theory inspired critiques of the very concepts 
of selfhood and alienation (see more, sec. 5). For phenomenologists, the issue 
might seem superseded by Heidegger’s and Sartre’s existential-ontological discus-
sion of authenticity. Besides, their specific contribution to affective (in-)authenticity 
has been sidelined by mainstream analytic and continental philosophers of emo-
tion, even if they have recently attracted some attention (Crowell 2015; Poellner 
2015; Withy 2015). It is then no coincidence that, to my knowledge, the last com-
prehensive treatment of emotions and alienation dates back to 1979, and it is cer-
tainly not accidental that it was penned in a Marxist spirit (Heller 1979).  
 I have two reasons for resurrecting this issue. The first has to do with seri-
ous conceptual confusion or underdetermination; for, even if emotional aliena-
tion has been treated rather stepmotherly in recent philosophical literature, use of 
the concept abounds ever since Arlie Hochschild’s seminal work on the sociology 
	 3 
of emotions.1 Hochschild introduced the concept side-by-side with the standard 
concept of alienated labor known from Marx (1844): “beneath the difference be-
tween physical and emotional labor”, she writes, “there lies a similarity in the pos-
sible cost of doing the work: the worker can become estranged or alienated from 
an aspect of self—either the body or the margins of the soul—that is ‘used’ to do 
the work” (Hochschild 1983, 7). Hochschild and subsequent critics of the com-
modification of emotions have made very productive use of the concept of alien-
ation. Unfortunately, however, within this ever-growing field of research, emo-
tional alienation remains wholly underdetermined. Here is one of the few defini-
tions Hochschild provides: 
 
When elements of [the private emotional system] are taken into the marketplace 
and sold as human labor, they become stretched into standardized social forms. In 
these forms, a person’s contribution of feeling is thinner, less freighted with con-
sequence; but at the same time it is seen as coming less from the self and being less 
directed to the other. For that reason it is more susceptible to estrangement. 
(Hochschild 1983, 13) 
 
But what exactly does it mean that “a person’s contribution to feeling” is “thin-
ner”, and what is deficient in the relation between emotion and the self (or “the 
margin of the soul”) in emotional alienation? Hochschild and fellow sociologists 
still owe us clear answers.  
 The second motivation for this paper stems from a social-critical conviction 
that many sociologists of emotions share, and above all Hochschild herself: 
namely that emotional labor and the logics of “emotional capitalism” (Illouz 
2007) increasingly make our affective life susceptible to emotional self-alienation.  
 To be sure, some philosophers of emotion have recently investigated the 
extent to which external, technological or socio-cultural ‘scaffolds’ facilitate, en-
hance or even co-constitute our affective make-up. But these discussions on so-
called extended emotions (Krueger 2014; Slaby 2014; Krueger & Szanto 2017; 
León et al. forthcoming) often seem, if not in the spirit of emotional capitalism, 
still too much in line with it. It is high time to supplement their focus and investi-
gate not just emotional extension but also what might be called ‘emotional inva-
sion’—a negative modulation of the affective life of individuals by heteronomous, 
intrusive factors and actors that those individuals cannot identify with or appro-
priate (cf. Slaby 2017). The present paper is intended as a modest contribution to 
this task. Its aim lies solely in first clarifying the concept of emotional self-
alienation (ESA).  																																																								
1 A notable philosophical exception is Brewer’s essay (2011), and it is telling that Brewer too 
takes Hochschild as his starting point; see more on his analyis below, sec. 4. 
2 Though the term ‘emotional self-alienation’ should prevent respective misconceptions, it might 
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 In pursuing this aim, I proceed as follows: I begin by outlining a relational 
account of alienation, according to which alienation is a tripartite deficient rela-
tion, or a “relation of relationlessness”, to oneself, others and the world (sec. 2). 
Next, I set the backdrop for clarifying what ESA is by first considering what it is 
not. In particular, I show that ESA is not reducible to cognate but different phe-
nomena such as feelings of being manipulated, coercion, and self-deception (sec. 
3). In the main part (sec. 4), I provide my positive multidimensional account. I 
distinguish between three dimensions of emotions that are deficient in ESA: the 
experiential, the self-disclosing and the normative dimensions of emotions. Ac-
cordingly, I first argue that ESA involves a blurring of the affective focus of an 
emotion, or cleavage of the affective and intentional dimensions of emotions. This 
results in a loss of affective sensitivity and the personal import of one’s emotions. 
Furthermore, I argue that, due to this, one cannot appropriately respond to the 
value-properties disclosed by one’s emotions and ultimately fails to integrate a 
given emotion into one’s overall evaluative outlook. Secondly, I show how this 
goes hand in hand with a deficiency in the self-disclosing dimension of emotions. 
Thus, I suggest that in ESA emotions are not revelatory of what matters or what 
ought to matter to oneself. Consequently, ESA involves a deficient articulation of 
the self in emotional expression and, more fundamentally, it hampers an essential 
function of emotions, namely the elaboration of one’s personal evaluative out-
look, or self-elaboration. Finally, I argue that ESA also negatively affects the 
normative dimension of emotions: it disrupts the balance between what I ought 
to feel, according to “feeling rules”, and what I actually feel. I explicate this defi-
ciency by drawing on Hochschild’s work on emotional labor and management. I 
demonstrate how the incorporation and habitualization of heteronomous feeling 
rules leads to an over-regulation of one’s emotions, which are in turn experienced 
as heteronomous. I conclude by addressing potential objections to and misunder-
standings of what emotional re-appropriation and authenticity are, and make cur-
sory remarks on how a so-called ‘critical theory of emotions’ might reply to them 
(sec. 5). 
 
2. What is Alienation? Sketch of a Relational Account 
 
Notwithstanding centuries-long attempts to define the concept, beginning with 
Hegel, Rousseau and Marx and continuing from Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
through to generations of Marxist thinkers, sociologists and Critical Theorists (cf. 
Jaeggi 2005), the philosophical notion of alienation is notoriously vague and not 
much better determined than its ordinary language counterpart. Indeed its vague-
ness is due in large part to the fact that it has typically been employed diagnosti-
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cally or normatively rather than descriptively, geared toward socio-political or 
sociocultural criticism. Its broader semantic field encompasses such phenomena 
as reification, inauthenticity, role-playing, lack of appropriation or identification, 
lack of self-mastery, or feelings of being dominated by some Other (the ‘alien’ in 
alienation or the ‘stranger’ in estrangement), be it a person, thing, some system or 
‘the world’. Regarding an even wider conceptual horizon, we might list cognates 
such as lack of belonging, conventionalization, a sense of absurdity or loss of ex-
istential meaning.  
 Though the notion of alienation is certainly not synonymous with or reduc-
ible to either of these notions, they have a common denominator. As Jaeggi con-
vincingly argues in her masterly comprehensive study, alienation is an essentially 
relational phenomenon. More precisely, alienation is a “deficient relation”, para-
doxically formulated as a “relation of relationlessness” (Jaeggi 2005, 25). The de-
ficiency at play in of relationlessness is not “a mere absence” of a relation but 
points to an ontologically, existentially or historically prior relation that one has 
had. Moreover, employing the notion of alienation to characterize the deficient 
quality of a (prior) relation is not just a descriptive enterprise, but also a norma-
tive one. It marks the fact that one ought to have the relation that one had or could 
have had, but doesn’t ‘own’ (any longer) (ibid.). This point is worth emphasizing. 
After all, relations to other people, things or events that one never (‘really’) has 
borne, or owned, in any robust sense of the term ‘relation’ are infinite. The ab-
sence of these relations simply does not matter to the subject. It is of no existen-
tial or affective concern whether one has or has owned them. But then indiffer-
ence rather than alienation characterizes the proper attitude towards them.  
 Thus, the subject of (self-)alienation always has a relation of personal con-
cern or impact to alienated entities or situations. Moreover, (self-)alienation al-
ways involves one’s own making, one’s own self and something alien to oneself. Alienat-
ed things, situations, or actions always involve one’s own performance, or, as we 
shall see in the case of emotions, one’s own feeling or expression—it’s just that 
this ownness, the possibility or means of appropriation, somehow gets lost or 
becomes unavailable in a sense yet to be specified. Lastly, alienation is always a 
three-dimensional relation: it is a relation of relationlessness at once to oneself, oth-
ers and the world. As I shall show in the next section, this three-dimensionality 
becomes particularly salient if we consider emotional self-alienation.  
 At this stage, however, we seem to face a paradox when conceiving of al-
ienation as involving a deficiency in the quality of our self-, other- and world-
directed relation. Emotions, as explicated in more detail below, are not some in-
ner bodily states (even though bodily feelings often accompany garden-variety 
emotions, such as fear, anger, etc.). They are essentially relational or intentional. 
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And emotions are relational in precisely the three-dimensional sense of alienation: 
they are at the same time expressive of oneself, disclosing something that matters 
to oneself, thus intentionally presenting worldly occurrences or others as having a 
certain value, and, by dint of their very (self-)expressive nature, they typically re-
late us in specific ways to others. Now, the initial paradox presents itself thus: if 
alienation is a relation of relationlessness to oneself, others and the world, and if 
emotions are essentially self- and world-related, how can one ever be alienated 
from, and least of all feel alienated from, one’s own emotions? In the next section, 
I aim to show that, emotions and self-alienation properly conceived, there are 
three different conceptions of the phenomenon of emotional self-alienation that 
do not lead to straightforward paradoxes, but rather illuminate something im-
portant about the way we emotionally relate to ourselves, the world and others. 
 
3.  What Emotional Self-Alienation is Not: Manipulation, Coercion, and 
Self-Deception 
 
Before elaborating on the three non-paradoxical senses in which someone might 
feel alienated from her own emotions, let me address a fundamental ambiguity in 
the very locution ‘emotional self-alienation’. There are two different readings 
when juxtaposing the terms ‘emotional’ and ‘self-alienation’.  
 (a) On the one hand, one might think of complex processes in which, by 
having certain emotions, one feels momentarily or robustly alienated from prior 
life-projects, from one’s own ‘self’—here one cannot properly relate to one’s ini-
tial self-image (‘I don’t recognize myself’; ‘This is/was not me.’)—from other 
people (‘Others seem alien to me.’), or from the world or ‘reality’ (‘I’ve lost touch 
with reality.’). This might be the case for example due to existential crisis, psy-
chopathological changes in affective disposition (e.g., in depression or phobias) 
or, less dramatically, newly acquired emotional experiences or dispositions (e.g., 
loving someone whose behaviour or values one cannot identify with or integrate 
into one’s previously held evaluative outlook). It is this notion of affectively, and 
often psychopathologically, induced more or less pervasive estrangement that 
some authors have investigated in terms of an “existential change” or “an all-
enveloping shift in one’s sense of ‘belonging to a shared world’” and in one’s rela-
tion to other people (Ratcliffe 2015, 14; see also Slaby et al. 2013).2  																																																								
2 Though the term ‘emotional self-alienation’ should prevent respective misconceptions, it might 
still be useful to warn against mistaking an analysis of ESA more generally for how to account for 
affectively or non-affectively induced feelings of alienation, or what it feels like to live or work under 
certain socio-economical, cultural, etc. conditions of alienation. This has so far been little 
scrutinized; see however in Heller 1979, Part II. 
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 (b) But there is another, narrower reading of ‘emotional self-alienation’, and 
this is the one I shall be exclusively concerned with here. According to this read-
ing, emotional self-alienation concerns not alienation from oneself and one’s ini-
tial existential embeddedness in a (shared) world, by virtue of certain emotional 
experiences or affective dispositions, but rather alienation from one’s own emotions. 
In the sense of ESA I wish to explore, one feels alienated from one’s own emo-
tions. But to get a grip on what this means, we must clearly delineate this feeling 
from a number of cognate but different phenomena.  
 First, it seems natural to assume that ESA would entail feelings of being 
affectively and/or cognitively manipulated. True, some form of affective manipula-
tion will typically initiate or result in ESA. Moreover, in ESA, one might and in-
deed typically will have the feeling of being manipulated. Yet, ESA is certainly not 
identical to and does not necessarily entail such a feeling. Even if one feels ma-
nipulated when one feels alienated from one’s emotions, the latter is not identical 
to what it is like to be manipulated. After all, I might well feel affectively manipulated, 
say by political rhetoric, in having come to hate certain political opponents or by 
subtle motivational triggers in looking forward to seeing the next episode of my 
favorite TV-series. This might even be the case were I to identify with my anger 
or ‘own up’, as it were, to my delight. Admittedly, in paradigm cases of affective 
manipulation, and especially in what I call ‘emotion invasion’, feelings of being 
manipulated will result in ESA and obstruct the appropriation of one’s emotions, 
but the systematic phenomenological point still holds: the very experience of feel-
ing manipulated such that one ends up having a given emotion E and of feeling al-
ienated from E are not identical. 
 Similar considerations apply to external forms of heteronomy and coercion. 
The issue in ESA is not that subjects feel by some heteronomous powers coerced 
to have certain emotions—be these coercive powers internalized, but heterono-
mous desires, akratic behaviour or doxastic akrasia (cf. Szanto 2017a), or some 
external triggers, etc. If this were at issue, the distinctive experiential characteristic 
of the phenomenon would simply disappear. Consider that alienation involves a 
deficient relation to oneself (and others and the world). But in clear-cut cases of 
affective heteronomy the relation does not concern some deficiency between me 
and myself, but between me and something alien to me, or some specific other, 
viz. something that clearly stands opposed to me. By ‘clear-cut cases’ I mean 
those in which the affective and epistemic boundary between what I feel to be 
mine and what I explicitly acknowledge or (pre-reflectively) understand to be thus 
and that which I clearly do not own—and do not wish to own or feel capable of 
owning in the first place—is well preserved.  
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 Accordingly, a key to understanding the phenomenology of ESA lies in 
appreciating its inextricable dialectics of owning and disowning emotions. In ESA, it 
is oneself that owns the given emotion; it is oneself feeling the emotion in the 
sense of experiencing, expressing or enacting it. At the same time, it is not oneself 
feeling it in the sense that one is not properly affected by what one feels or expe-
riences. I will come back to this point. For now, keeping this dialectics of identi-
fying-with and not identifying with what oneself affectively experiences should 
suffice to demarcate proper instances of ESA from seemingly similar but differ-
ent forms of heteronomy. Jaeggi aptly captures this difference between (self-
)alienation on the one hand and coercion, pretense and deception on the other: 
 
In both coercion and deception the boundary between what is one’s own and 
what is alien is preserved; [in phenomena of inauthenticity], in contrast, there 
seems to be a complicated entanglement of the two where what is “one’s own” it-
self becomes questionable or deficient. (Jaeggi 2005, 71; cf. also 53-54, 58, 70) 
 
But one might wonder whether in contradistinction to what I have called ‘clear-
cut’ cases of internal or external heteronomy there might be ‘non-clear-cut’ cases 
that would amount to ESA. By non-clear-cut cases, I am thinking in particular of 
self-deception. Though ESA might easily be confounded with self-deception, we 
have to distinguish it both from doxastic self-deception due to emotional biases 
and from properly speaking emotional self-deception. Consider first doxastic self-
deception. Proposals for how to account for self-deceptive belief are legion, but 
according to one standard conception it entails the following: a subject S has rea-
son to believe p, acknowledges that her warrants for p are stronger than those for 
q, acknowledges that p and q are incompatible, and yet forms or maintains the 
belief that q. In short, the self-deceptive believer believes something in the teeth 
of evidence to the contrary. Now, there may be many, if only irrational, reasons 
or a-rational motivations for such forms of irrationality, including emotional or 
affective biases (cf. Mele 2001; Szanto 2017a). We have some deficient self-
relation involved here, and it is also true that often this deficiency results in ESA. 
However, nothing speaks for equating such affectively induced forms of irration-
ality with ESA. First of all, according to most standard accounts, ordinary self-
deception is a form of motivated irrationality. It typically entails an intentional or 
deliberate procedure; one brings oneself to form self-deceptive beliefs. This is mark-
edly different in self-alienation. After all, one of the distinctive characteristics of 
self-alienation is a certain heteronomy, which involves a loss or at least a sense of 
lack of control over oneself. Secondly, what is deficient in self-deceptive beliefs is 
the relation that one has towards one’s beliefs. Even if they involve beliefs about 
oneself, and even if these beliefs are affectively biased, what is at stake here is my 
relation to my beliefs and not my emotions. 
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 This is of course different in self-deceptive emotions (SE). Assuming the 
structure of doxastic self-deception, it is not immediately clear how we should 
conceive of SE, without ending up with outright paradoxical formulations (which, 
as a matter of fact, also haunt most descriptions of doxastic self-deception). One 
possibility would be to say that SE occurs if one has sufficient reason to believe 
that one experiences an emotion E, but—due to some set of values, beliefs, mor-
al or normative stances, which make it seem undesirable or wrong for the subject 
to have E—one makes oneself believe that one experiences another emotion E* 
or no emotion at all. However, the deficient relation to my emotions here is still a 
doxastic relation: I make myself believe not to have emotions that I experience. But 
again, isn’t it a form of dis-identification or self-distancing that we are seeking? 
All depends on how exactly we cash out the very process of dis-identification 
here. If it were an affective process, whereby in some yet to be specified sense, I 
feel distanced or dis-identified from my own emotions, we would have ESA. But 
this seems not to be the case here: in SE, the process of dis-identification stems 
from a gap between what I, according to some set of values or some normative 
self-conception or self-image, want to be, and what I in fact feel. I eventually seek 
to close this gap by a doxastic process, namely a self-deceptive belief about my 
emotions. Properly speaking, however, I don’t feel alienated from my emotions. 
Rather, in having an emotion, I feel alienated from my desired self-image, and try 
to intervene by self-deceptive belief formation. 
 Still, one may argue that there are cogent forms of self-deception that in 
fact show all the signs of a deficient affective relation to oneself, characteristic of 
ESA. One such form is a certain emotional inauthenticity famously analyzed by 
Sartre in terms of what he calls ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise fois).3 In fact, in some formu-
lations, Sartre’s bad faith represents a conception of emotional self-deception that 
closely resembles ESA. However, as I want to show, it is still not quite the phe-
nomenon we are looking for.  
 As the notion somewhat misleadingly indicates, bad faith is a negative atti-
tude towards a belief, i.e. a doxastic attitude, albeit a special one. Bad faith is a 
form of lying to oneself, a lie to oneself about the structure of one’s own exist-
ence. But what is it that the subject lies about in bad faith? According to Sartre, 
the false belief planted in oneself is not so much about worldly events, states of 
affairs, character traits, or specific emotions, but about one’s ontological self-
understanding and self-relation. Bad faith is an existential lie about one’s very being 
or the basic nature of ‘human reality’ (or Dasein) itself. For Sartre, human reality is 
characterized by the pervasive freedom to choose oneself and to endorse, at any 																																																								
3 We find another account, also from the classical-phenomenological tradition, in Scheler’s 
discussion of emotional self-deception (Scheler 1919). I come back to that in sec. 4. 
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time, one’s ever-open possibilities. In bad faith, one negates one’s own spontanei-
ty and freedom. But it is not just up to oneself to do so. Bad faith is not merely a 
contingent, deviant form of self-relation but an essential, albeit non-authentic, 
mode of being. Bad faith discloses the intrinsic negativity of human reality by 
means of which one constitutes oneself as not being what one is or as being what 
one is not, to put it in Sartre’s paradoxical formulation. One identifies one’s own 
human reality (Being-for-itself) with the reality of objects (Being-in-itself). Bad faith 
then is grounded in human reality’s proper existential-ontological structure. It is a 
pervasive existential attitude of self-negation and self-reification.  
 What happens now if one thus negates affective states one has, or is in bad 
faith about a desire or emotion one has? Sartre gives an out-dated if not chauvin-
istic example of a woman who agrees to a date with a man who is apparently at-
tracted to her, a fact she very well acknowledges. Although she seemingly recip-
rocates his desire and intentions, she cannot, or wishes not to, integrate those 
desires into her self-image as a respectable woman. While aware of the delicacy of 
the situation when he reaches for her hand, which would call for an “immediate 
decision”, instead of owning up to the decision, “she does not want to realize [its] 
urgency (…) that is, she does not want to see possibilities (…) which [the man’s] 
conduct presents” (Sartre 1943, 55). The important point for our present purpos-
es is that Sartre conceives of this (self-)denial as a phenomenon we have already 
encountered above: a failure to integrate affective states into one’s self-
conception. The deficient relation to oneself is again not so much a deficient af-
fective relation to one’s affective states but a deficiency in the coherence of what 
one wants or desires and what wants to be. The deficiency is due to the fact that 
“she does not quite know what she wants,” Sartre tells us (ibid.). This deficiency 
then results in a motivated, self-deceptive blurring of one’s own desires and even-
tually in the reification of one’s (bodily) desires as not belonging to oneself. In-
stead, according to Sartre, one would need to recognize one’s personal, or exis-
tential freedom: “In order to satisfy her, there must be a feeling which is 
addressed wholly to her personality—i.e., to her full freedom—and which would be 
a recognition of her freedom.” (ibid.) But this is exactly what she fails to do. 
 Sartre’s reference to the feeling not being “addressed to the whole personali-
ty” is on the right track. As we shall see (sec. 4) the deficient relation to precisely 
that aspect of feelings that involves one’s overall personality is indeed one of the 
key features of ESA. Still, the process of self-negation in bad faith, as Sartre con-
ceives of it, is not so much a form of self-alienation, for neither the dimension of 
	 11 
self that is negated here (one’s freedom to choose) nor the desire one veils from 
oneself is something alien to oneself.4 
 Regarding the last point concerning desires, a further qualification is in or-
der. One might be attracted to the idea that ESA entails the sort of self-alienation 
one may indeed feel when one cannot identify with one’s own desires. Suppose a 
staunch pacifist, who regularly participates in rallies against the Second Amend-
ment, suddenly discovers at an NRA-arms-fair his fascination for heavy air rifles, 
which eventually grows into a secret passion. Here, even though the relational 
structure of alienation from one’s own desires very much resembles emotional 
self-alienation, we must distinguish the case for the following reason: though de-
sires may involve some overall personal concerns, which is also characteristic of 
those emotions from which one may feel alienated, they lack a clear-cut distinc-
tion between the intentional object and the affective focus that is characteristic 
for emotions. However, since an important part of my analysis of ESA will draw 
on precisely this distinction we need a separate analysis of the phenomenon, one 
that I cannot engage in here (for a convincing analysis, see Jaeggi 2014, 104-119).  
 One final caveat is in order before we can get a handle on what ESA actual-
ly is. Similar to the potential deficiency in identifying with one’s desires, recalci-
trant emotions and disruptions due to emotional self-deception, ambivalent or out-
right conflicting emotions will not necessarily lead to ESA. That somebody, for in-
stance, harbors resentment and, at the same time, admiration towards a person, 
or cannot resolve an emotional conflict between the disappointment of not get-
ting a job in a foreign country and being relieved about being rejected because she 
doesn’t want to leave her family behind, does not mean that this person feels al-
ienated from her own emotions. Again, enduring ambivalences and conflicts of 
this sort might often result in the experience of ESA, but they need not. One 
might also ‘own up’ to both emotions and ensuing ‘affective gaps’ within oneself, 
and accept such emotional incoherencies without feeling alienated from either of 
the given emotions.  
 
4. Three Dimensions of Emotional Self-Alienation 
 
What then is ESA? As we have seen, on the narrower reading I have suggested 
above, ESA initially means that one feels alienated from one’s own emotions. Recall that 
I have contrasted this with feelings of alienation from one’s own projects, life, 
self, others or the world, maybe in virtue of some affective disturbances, such as 
depression or otherwise. In the following, I want to analyze the narrower mean-																																																								
4 Here, I partly disagree with Jaeggi, who interprets Sartre’s bad faith as a form of self-alienation; 
cf. Jaeggi 2005, esp. 19-20 and 91-92.  
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ing of ESA in terms of three different but interrelated dimensions of what it 
means not to—or, better, not to appropriately or to deficiently—feel one’s own emotions. 
Observe that I take ESA to entail a deficiency in feeling one’s own emotions, i.e. a 
deficient affective self-relation, and not a deficiency in lacking the affective or ‘feel-
ing’ dimension of emotions or lacking certain emotions altogether. I take extreme 
cases of not feeling anything (relative to certain situations, persons, events, etc.) 
or not having emotions altogether not to get at the core of ESA. Such extreme 
forms of not feeling anything at all might arise in severe depression (Ratcliffe 
2015) or existential-ontological deficiencies in affective “attunement”, or what 
Heidegger characterizes as a “slipping away from ourselves”, an “emptiness” or a 
“leaving ourselves behind in abandoning ourselves to whatever there is” in “pro-
found boredom” (Heidegger 1929-30, 119; cf. Slaby 2010). To be clear, such defi-
ciencies might well amount to forms of ESA, but not in the sense I wish to ex-
plore here, namely of not appropriately feeling one’s own emotions.  
 To be sure, everything hinges upon how precisely to conceive of what ‘not 
properly’ or ‘deficiently’ means here. As we shall see, what I certainly do not want 
to suggest is that the adequacy condition here has anything to do with some sen-
sational components or some kind of intensity of (bodily) feelings. Rather, it has 
to do with the following three components: (1) the clarity of the affective-
intentional focus of emotions; (2) their self-revelatory or self-disclosing dimension, and 
finally (3) the normativity of emotions, or the appropriate relation between one’s 
experiencing, regulating and expressing an emotion, on the one hand, and the 
(extrinsic) norms of emotions, or feeling rules, on the other. According to these 
three dimensions, genuine cases of ESA entail either one or all three of the di-
mensions. Thus, any of these dimensions may occur independently or weigh dif-
ferently in ESA. Typically, however, since they are variously interrelated, they will 
be manifest in tandem and indeed reinforce each other. In any case, whenever 
one or another of these dimensions is deficient, we will have to say that the given 
subject is (affectively) not identifying with or fails to ‘own up to’ her own emo-
tion. And it is this non-appropriation that is also expressed by the notion of not 
‘appropriately’ feeling one’s emotions in ESA. 
 Consider, then, the following senses in which one might be said to not ap-
propriately feel one’s emotions: 
  
(1) not appropriately feeling what one feels 
(2) not appropriately feeling what oneself feels, but rather what ‘one’s Other’ or 
others feel 
(3) not appropriately feeling what one ought to or supposedly could feel  
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As should be obvious, these three senses refer to three dimensions of emotions: 
their affective and experiential, first-personal, and normative dimensions. At the 
same time, they refer to three deficient relations of a subject of a given emotion 
to her feeling that emotion. Let me now explicate these deficiencies in turn. 
 (1) As already mentioned, not appropriately feeling one’s own emotions 
does not mean that one does not feel one’s emotions intensively or somehow 
‘deeply’ enough.5 ESA has nothing to do with purely affective, sensational or ex-
periential intensities. Instead, I now want to argue that it concerns the blurring, 
dissociation or the complete gapping of two essential—and, in appropriately felt 
emotions, essentially intertwined—dimensions of emotions, namely their affective 
and intentional dimensions. My thesis is that ESA is a deficiency in how a subject 
tares the balance between these two dimensions. Thus, contrary to appearances, 
though ESA is a relation of relationlessness that crucially involves the self, it 
should not be conceived in some internalist fashion, as if ESA were merely an 
experiential deficiency in subjects. Rather, it concerns the complex relation that a 
subject entertains regarding the objects of her emotions, understood as felt inten-
tional evaluations of those objects. And this seems to be just the right consequence, 
given that I have characterized (self-)alienation as a relational process that in-
volves not just the self but always equally the world.  
 To understand this better we need to introduce some conceptual distinc-
tions. I will draw on the vocabulary developed within the affective intentionality 
paradigm (Slaby & Stephan 2008), and notably by Peter Goldie and Bennett 
Helm. According to this influential, and in my view most convincing contempo-
rary account, beyond a number of other components (expressive, bodily, regula-
tive, etc.), emotions have a specific intentionality that picks out a given target in a 
way that equals no other intentional or mental state (such as belief or desire). An 
irreducible component of the very intentional directedness of an emotional expe-
rience is its affective content. Thus, emotions are psychological states that are not 
just intentionally but, at the same time, affectively directed at their intentional 
targets. According to a well-known construal by Goldie, they are distinguished by 
subjects’ “feeling towards” their emotional targets. Feeling towards is a “thinking 
of with feeling” (2000, 19), i.e. a special way of thinking of a given object that is 
radically different from how ordinary intentional thought presents its objects. The 
very intentional content of, say, fearing something is different from merely per-
ceiving or thinking of something as dangerous.	 Suppose I’m cycling down a 
winding mountain road with high speed towards the next curve. In ‘thinking of’ 
the curve it ‘with feeling’, I not only perceive and cognitively grasp the danger, I 																																																								
5 Below, I come back to how ESA does indeed affect emotional ‘depth’, albeit in a different sense 
of the term than experiential characterizations capture.  
	 14 
am afraid of it. The next day, thinking of the event safely passed, I still 
aknoweldge the dangerousness of the situation and may be angry with myself for 
having been incautiously fast. However, I no longer feel the danger. I think of the 
curve as dangerous, but I’m not thinking of it with feeling. (Goldie 2000, 19, 58-
9). In emotions, the ‘thought’ presents the given object as having an affective 
import for the subject. Without being some “add-on” to the ‘thought’, thinking of 
with feeling picks out the affectively salient and relevant properties of a particular 
object, namely those that matter to the subject.  
 On a congenial view put forth by Helm, this feeling towards aspect is char-
acterized as a “felt evaluation” (Helm 2001, 29-41; 2009, 49-74). Emotions, un-
derstood as felt evaluations, are directed at certain evaluative properties of an 
object. The intentional target of an emotion is the evaluative property of the ob-
ject that has (affective) “import” for the subject. To specify the way in which the 
evaluative properties of an emotional target have import for the subject and make 
intelligible the relation that those evaluative properties bear to a particular object, 
Helm introduces the notion of the “focus” of an emotion. We need to make this 
relation intelligible because one cannot readily read off the evaluative property in 
focus simply by looking at the (type or token of) emotion at hand and the target-
ed particular object. Accordingly, the focus can also be characterized as the im-
plicit “background object” of the emotion (Helm 2009, 58). The target and the 
focus of emotions do not necessarily coincide. To illustrate: my fear that some-
body may break into my house while I’m on holiday and steal my irreplaceable 
vintage bike, and my furious anger at the bicycle repairman, who, due to utterly 
careless handling, damages its pristine chrome-frame, have different objects and 
are different types of emotions (viz. fear of robbery and anger at the experienced 
repairman’s carelessness). But my emotional focus is identical here (the import 
that the bike has for me), and this, not the type of emotion (anger, fear), is what 
individuates the target of an emotion. It is also in light of the focus, namely the 
import that my bike has for me, that makes both my fear and anger intelligible. 
And there is more to the way an emotion’s focus targets an object as having per-
sonal, affective import. Crucially, the intelligibility, and indeed rationality, of a 
given emotion depends on the evaluation of its target being warranted or not. The 
focus of emotions, understood as “feelings of import”, does not only make the 
import salient, it also carries normative powers (cf. Helm 2009, 58). Moreover, it 
represents the standard against which a given emotion can be assessed as appropri-
ate or not. Thus, my furious anger at the repairman would be unwarranted and 
hence irrational if I were not to care about my bike at all, and it would be equally 
inappropriate if the damage to the frame were so minimal that it was hardly visi-
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ble to the bare eye and had no influence whatsoever on the impeccable function-
ing of the bike.  
 Emotions, then, are “a kind of sensitivity or responsiveness to the import 
of one’s situation: emotions are essentially intentional feelings of import” (Helm 
2007, 58). Emotions, as a form of sensitivity to import, are affective; as evaluative 
of objects of import they are intentional, and as responsive to import they are sub-
ject to norms and warrants. Emotions, as intentional feelings of import, are affective, 
intentional and normative at the same time. Below, we will see how this point 
about the normativity of emotions carries over to the third sense of ESA, accord-
ing to which one is not appropriately feeling what one ought to or supposedly 
could feel. For the moment, let’s concentrate on the affective and intentional di-
mensions and on how they come apart in ESA. 
 I want to argue now that in ESA the focus of an emotion becomes blurred 
and the subject eventually loses the sensitivity to the import of one’s own emo-
tions. More precisely, the sense that something has personal import for me gets 
lost. In self-alienated emotions the sensitivity and personal import become pale or 
vanish completely. When someone is not appropriately feeling what one feels, 
what wanes is the feeling of personal import of one’s emotions. But are self-
alienated emotions still emotions then? Recall that I have defined emotions in 
terms of their affective intentionality, or in Helm’s terms as intentional feelings of 
import. Self-alienated emotions are still felt and they are still intentional. They are 
felt in the sense that they are experienced as evaluations one has or has had for-
merly; but they are not felt in the sense of mattering to or affecting oneself. And, as 
evaluative stances, they are still properly intentional. They are still directed at 
some target object. But what becomes blurred is the emotion’s focus, the dimen-
sion that relates the evaluative property of the target to the import that the object 
(supposedly) has or has had for the subject.  
 To be sure, notions such as the ‘blurring’ of the affective focus or the im-
port’s ‘becoming pale’ are not only metaphorical, but also essentially vague, ad-
mitting of fine-grained nuances. And this reflects the process quite well. For 
whether we have a case of someone not having any access to the evaluative focus 
and eventually not feeling any import at all or losing all sensitivity to affectively 
responding to it, or whether the import becomes of no overall personal concern, 
yet still has some pale effect on the subject, will be a matter of situative differ-
ences. In either case, however, the crucial point is that, when someone feels alien-
ated from her emotions, it is the emotions’ import, in the sense just specified, that 
is deficient.  
 But this is just one side of the story regarding the cleavage of the two di-
mensions, i.e., the affective and the intentional. Emotions are intrinsically affec-
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tive and intentional, and one dimension is not just an “add-on” to the other 
(Goldie 2000); they are intrinsically interwoven. Self-alienated emotions not only 
do not affectively impact the subject. Conversely, there is also a deficiency on the 
part of the intentionality or the evaluative dimension of the respective feelings. 
This is because the properties that the intentional feelings evaluate no longer 
match with the (overall or contextually relevant) evaluative outlook of the person.  
 Let me exemplify this with two different cases of ESA, stressing the differ-
ent sides of the affective-intentional gap in ESA. First, slightly altering the exam-
ple of the staunch pacifist who develops a secret passion for rifles and war-games, 
suppose that he is still (negatively) appraising them according to his still dearly 
held moral and political convictions. But both these and his appraisal have lost 
their affective grip on him; he might still feel some repugnance or even disgust 
towards the martial display of his own and/or others’ affects. At the same time, 
he feels that it is these affects—and not his repugnance or disgust—that relate 
him more appropriately to his target (the games, rifles, etc.). He has, then, lost his 
initial relation to his evaluative target; he bears a ‘relation of affective relationless-
ness’ to it. Conversely, his halfway self-confessed blind admiration for a star-
player in his favorite ego-shooter game is not compatible with his still firmly up-
held, overall evaluative outlook on violence or war-games.6 Or take a flight at-
tendant who not only delivers comforting smiles and constant charm to passen-
gers and her colleagues but, unable to attend to her own emotional dispositions 
and moods after years of service, also displays a diffuse and soothing cheerfulness 
at home with her partner and children, even if the housework becomes unbeara-
bly straining. While she thus navigates changing situations with her invariable 
emotional expression, her affective malleability to the varying affective import of 
given situations and interpersonal encounters becomes rigid. She loses the appro-
priate affective responsiveness to her environment as well as to her own affective 
sensitivity. 
 The cases differ not only regarding which of the two dimensions of emo-
tions is deficiently related to oneself; they also differ as to the causes of these de-
ficiencies. While the pacifist is subject to ESA due to his own failure to calibrate 
his affective and evaluative focus according to his changing affective dispositions, 
the flight attendant and her fellow emotional laborers in the service industry are 
subject to what I have called emotion invasion. Here, the cleavage results from 
the fact that others, social media, companies, etc., implicitly or explicitly make 
persons attend only to specific functional aspects of emotions, and typically to 
their expressive or emotion-regulative dimensions, and make them ignore their 																																																								
6 Notice that this is not a problem of not being able to identify with his desires or affective 
dispositions, which led him to have these emotions in the first place; see above, sec. 3. 
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evaluative, feeling dimension. Eventually, this ignorance becomes habitualized 
and the person turns herself her own initially felt evaluations into mere functional 
appraisals or mere expressions of evaluations. 
 To summarize the findings so far: ESA in the sense of not appropriately 
feeling one’s emotions either means that one’s felt intentional evaluations are not 
felt, in the sense that they don’t affect or impact one personally, or that one can-
not integrate the values thus targeted, or appraised, into one’s overall evaluative 
outlook. In either case, we see that there is a cleavage between the affective and 
intentional dimensions; at the same time, we have a deficiency in how either or 
both of those dimensions impact or are appropriately related to me or, more pre-
cisely, to my affective sensitivity, my responsiveness to (my) values, or my overall 
evaluative outlook.  
 (2) At this point, we have to turn to the second sense of ESA: ‘not feeling 
what oneself is feeling’, the sense in which ESA exhibits a deficient relation or a 
certain relationlessness to the self. In elaborating this sense, I want to bring into 
relief an idea that I have already hinted at repeatedly: the idea that in ESA emo-
tions do not impact or affect the very person who has them. My claim is that this 
deficiency concerns a deficiency in the self-revelatory or self-disclosing function of 
emotions. 
 To understand this, we have to say a word about the relation of emotions to 
the self. As a number of authors emphasize, emotions are self-involving in a rich-
ly specified sense. This goes well beyond the sense in which many emotions, 
“emotions of self-care” as Pugmire calls them (2005, 101), directly involve the 
self: for example shame, pride, remorse or embarrassment. The self-involving 
character I have in mind here concerns a fundamental web of relations that emo-
tions generally bear to the self. Even if not all emotions are about the self, and the 
self is not always “on the stage”, the self is always “present as the stage” of emo-
tions (Pugmire 2005, 100). What exactly does that mean? First, whatever is in 
view in and through an emotion is something that is in view from a distinctively 
first-personal vantage point, or what Goldie (2001) calls a “personal”, as opposed 
to an “impersonal”, point of view. Emotions are necessarily such that they can 
only be experienced from one’s own point of view (cf. Slaby & Stephan 2008).7 
But emotions are not just experienced from a personal point view; they also repre-
sent such a view, both to myself and to others. When I or others think or talk 
about emotions, we typically employ personal pronouns or proper names. This is 
not for merely trivial grammatical reasons. Rather, we want to mark what I, or she 
or he was feeling on a given occasion, not what anybody could or would have 																																																								
7 Notice that I do not take this to preclude genuinely shared emotional experiences, see Szanto 
2015, 2017, León, Szanto, & Zahavi forthcoming. 
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felt. Moreover, as Goldie and others emphasize, emotions “are embedded in and 
interweaving with the rest of the person’s emotional life and other aspects of his 
mood and character” (Goldie 2001, 16). They are only comprehensible to oneself 
and others by placing them over and against a more complex and enduring “ra-
tional pattern of felt evaluations” (Helm 2001) that form the fabric of which per-
sons are partly made. In understanding that I was no longer jealous because my 
love was already waning I understand something about the person I have be-
come. In understanding that it was not an irrational overreaction that she became 
so furious at him despite his seemingly innocuous remark, because I learn that 
she was deeply hurt by his similar remarks made repeatedly before, I understand 
something about her personality and personal history.  
 Emotions, then, do not only convey my or your evaluative perspective; they 
also always convey something about me or you. This, in essence, is what it means 
that emotions “contain an ineliminable reference to the self” (Nussbaum 2001, 
52). And this is not a mere referential or epistemic relation. Emotions don’t con-
vey value-neutral information about a person. They bear an axiological relation to 
the self, conveying information about what matters for one’s wellbeing or con-
tributes to personal flourishing. Here is how in his inimitably elegant phrasing 
Pugmire expresses this point (for a similar view, see Nussbaum 2001, 30-33): 
 
some of the things I recognize to be important do actually concern me. Among 
these, perhaps foremost among them, are the things I have ‘made my own’. That 
is, certain things become incorporated as conditions of my well-being while others 
are left to languish in the conative cold. (…) The result is a personalized ordering 
of the world in which things matter according to the part they can play in my 
flourishing (or lack of it). (…) We then keenly appraise events as they impinge on 
the articles of the world’s furniture we have so artfully arranged into our personal 
sanctuary. And these are the appraisals that stir us to emotion, draw us out from 
the sidelines. (Pugmire 2005, 102) 
 
Now, the focus of emotions involves both an exposure of objects and events of 
value and self-exposure. It takes in view what matters to me in a given moment, 
not just in objective time but rather in the context of my life and personal flour-
ishing.8 The focus is an affective focus because our appraisals are not mere inten-
tional judgments, but “made our own”. They are made our own if their affective 
																																																								
8 This should not be misunderstood as if ESA was a punctual or momentary phenomenon. Quite 
the contrary: ESA can only be understood as a form of self-alienation, once the subject of ESA 
acknowledges her own previous evaluative stances or places a given emotion into the context of 
one’s diachronically robust evaluative outlook. Incidentally, here we have another difference to 
so-called ‘straight’ cases of self-deception (Mele 2001), in which someone holds a false belief p at 
t, while acknowledging contradictory evidence to p at t. 
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impact “draws us out from the sidelines”. And emotions fail to do so, I argue, 
when we are alienated from them.  
 In particular, I want to argue that in ESA emotions do not (fully) disclose 
what they otherwise do, namely the evaluative perspective of the person who has 
them. Again, this deficiency has to do with the blurring of the affective-
intentional focus of emotions. The blurring of what’s in view via the affective 
dimension of the focus is accompanied by a lack of personal investment in, or com-
mitment to, the evaluative perspective that the emotion offers. One lacks such af-
fective investment if one is unwilling or unable to really adopt or follow up on the 
given evaluative perspective. One may still see the object in the light of an evalua-
tive perspective. Alienated emotions need not lose their evaluative function as 
such. But one feels at the same time that the given perspective is precisely not 
one’s own. Accordingly, “the conception of emotion as keyed to the personal 
incorporation of its objects” (Pugmire 2005, 103) shifts to a conception of emo-
tion as a mere evaluative judgment. Lack of emotional appropriation here then 
means that the object of the emotion is not incorporated into a person’s overall 
evaluative perspective. The given evaluative perspective cannot be integrated into 
one’s overall evaluative outlook because the evaluative properties of the intentional 
object are not appropriately targeted: they are not ‘in focus’.9 Conversely, the 
overall evaluative outlook no longer matches the actually felt emotions. This, 
however, is not due to some cognitive or reflective failure10 but to the lack of 
affective commitment.  
 This is precisely what happens to our pacifist, who fails to incorporate his 
actually felt intentional evaluations into his previously held evaluative outlook. He 
might still be cognitively committed to his moral and political convictions, but he 
has lost affective attachment to them and his ‘former self’, upon whom they have 
ceased to exert affective powers. At the same time, he still feels, in whatever in-
choate ways, committed to that former self. The self, then, that is now affectively 
impacted by war-games rubs against the self in which war-games were precisely 
not incorporated, but rather foreign objects. Thus, his repugnance to his actually 
felt evaluation (his admiration for the star-player) “fails to embody” his affective 
commitment to the object, or is “not keyed to” it. Accordingly, the web of those 																																																								
9 Here, my account is similar to but relevantly different from Brewer’s, who cashes this out in 
terms of a ‘refusal’ of ‘acknowledgement’: “Emotions might be alien either in an objective sense 
or in a subjective sense. Objectively, emotions are alien when they express the evaluative outlook 
not of the person in whom they arise but rather of some other agent. Subjectively, emotions are 
alien when the person in whom they arise refuses to acknowledge the evaluative outlook 
embedded in them as his own” (Brewer 2011, 275). See more on Brewer below. 
10 It bears stressing that one need not be explicitly or reflectively aware of an affective evaluation 
as being one’s own in order to feel alienated from it. On self-reflective alienation, cf. Moran 2001, 
esp. 33-34. 
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emotions that he now has does not form a rationally coherent pattern. And they 
don’t cohere rationally not because of some cognitive deficiency, but because the 
underlying commitments don’t form an affectively sound pattern.  
 In this way ESA disrupts what Pugmire explores in terms of “emotional 
depth”, the “soundness” or “integrity” of emotions. Notice again that emotional 
depth is not a matter of experiential intensities or strength of (bodily) sensations. 
Rather, as Pugmire convincingly argues, it is primarily a matter of “how much 
[emotion] reflects (or achieves) an underlying alignment of the body of the per-
son’s concerns” (2005, 42). It is a matter of overall “embeddedness” in the dia-
chronically robust web of a person’s concerns, and ultimately her “life”, and can 
only be measured holistically, by “the degree of embedding of an emotion’s prox-
imate ground in the whole field of one’s concerns” (ibid., 43). Though this is a 
subjective dimension of emotional depth, it should by no means be understood 
internalistically, as if embeddedness were only a matter of intra-personal coher-
ence. On the contrary, Pugmire rightly argues that intra-personal embeddedness 
must be supplemented by external and relational criteria in order to account for 
depth.  
 Here appropriateness in terms of external grounds and warrants for emo-
tions comes into play again. Emotional depth depends on the coherence between 
what affects me personally and what affective reaction a given worldly situation 
“calls” for: “I can only be too unaffected in relation to what is actually called for, 
i.e. to some standard of how affected I need to be in the situation which is exter-
nal to how affected I am”, and hence “part of what decides the weight of an emo-
tion lies beyond the emotion in the world at which it is directed” (ibid., 50, 51). 
Thus, in ESA, emotions not only lose their function to register what has import 
for me but the targeted objects also lose their status as grounds and warrants for 
my evaluative stances. 
 We find a congenial point from the early phenomenologist and value-realist 
Scheler in a little-known passage in his essay on self-deception, where he consid-
ers self-deceptive illusions regarding one’s own emotions. Scheler claims that 
such illusions are due to an erroneous internalist reversal of the intentional direct-
edness of emotions: 
 
we can also see in the field of values and their relations to feeling and to the objects 
of feeling a (…) natural direction of deception (Täuschungsrichtung): The feeling of a 
person is initially straightforwardly directed upon the values which adhere to ob-
jects; and that to an extent, that she tends to overlook her own emotive reaction to 
the value, her being “delighted” about something, her being sad about something; 
or, in contrast, tends to transfuse (aufprägen) the quality of the value, due to which 
that emotive reaction arises, upon her emotive reaction. Thus, not empathetic pro-
jection of one’s own feelings into the object and their values (Einfühlung von Eigen-
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gefühlen in die Sache) is the primary direction of deception, but rather the very oppo-
site of this phenomenon, namely the transference-from-outside-to-the-inside (Von-
außen-nach-innen-Verlegen) of felt (…) value-qualities of things and situations into 
the sphere of feelings of one’s own egoic states (Ich-zustände). (Scheler 1919, 262, 
own translation) 
 
This reversal, or suspension, of the intentionality of felt evaluation eventually 
leads to the emotion being experienced or felt inappropriately (auf unechte Weise), 
or as a “shadow” of itself (ibid.). Hence, it is precisely the loss of focus on external 
warrants, i.e. upon the object’s value-properties conveyed by the felt evaluation, 
that renders the very affective dimension of emotions pale; it is not the loss of 
some unspecified intensity of bodily feelings or inner sensations that has this ef-
fect (cf. ibid. 263f.). 
 Now, given the self-revelatory role of emotions, it should be easy to see 
what happens if ESA becomes a habitualized feature of one’s affective life or if 
one becomes robustly alienated from one’s emotional sensitivity. If one’s emo-
tions robustly lose their evaluative responsiveness, ESA hampers what Brewer 
calls the “self-elaboration of person”. Self-elaboration is rendering transparent 
one’s initially indeterminate and “inchoate” “evaluative outlook” (Brewer 2011, 
289). This can only be achieved precisely by emotions, for it is emotions that 
“give expression to the self’s pre-reflective evaluative posture towards the world, 
and they provide crucial raw material for the lifelong task of working up this ini-
tial posture into a mature and discerning outlook upon the values in play in our 
changing circumstances” (ibid., 275).  Emotions have this dual aspect: express-
ing a subject’s evaluative stance and individuating values for her. In doing so, they 
elaborate what matters for oneself. Rendering one’s emotions transparent and 
articulate, one simultaneously performs the work of self-elaboration. “When we 
try to get straight on what we feel, then, we do not face two separate tasks: to 
make our evaluative stance articulate and to clarify whatever values are in view. 
These are at heart the same task—the task (…) of self-elaboration” (ibid., 288). 
And Brewer rightly maintains that emotional alienation is just that: a disruption or 
disfiguration of this never fully accomplished task of self-elaboration. A robustly 
emotionally alienated person would then not only be episodically uninvolved and 
unaffected, but ultimately remain immature. 
 The deficient articulation of the self in ESA is also displayed when it comes 
to emotional expression. This becomes particularly vivid in representatives of emo-
tional laborers in the service industry, such as flight attendants. In Hochschild’s 
fitting capture, flight attendants see their ever-required smiles as an “extension of 
the make-up”; like literal make-up, “they are on them, but not of them” 
(Hochschild 1983, 8). This would not be so remarkable were such ‘self-void’ 
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emotions only episodic features of ordinary, deliberate self-presentation or role-
playing (Goffman 1956), or of so-called “surface acting”. However, it becomes a 
more pervasive and more perturbing feature if the expression of such emotions, 
devoid of their self-disclosing function, is performed by “everyday deep acting” 
(Hochschild 1983, 37-48). This happens if subjects unwittingly enact emotions 
according to conventionalized, socioculturally prescribed or even corporately 
codified and enforced “feeling rules” (ibid., 56-75). Feeling rules police and pos-
sibly sanction not only the form and appropriateness of emotional display (e.g., to 
enhance the quality and the profit of customer-service exchanges), but also “the 
extent (one can feel ‘too’ angry or ‘not angry enough’), the direction (one can feel 
sad when one should feel happy), and the duration of a feeling, given the situation 
against which it is set” (Hochschild 1979, 564). Thus, they deeply modulate the 
very content and phenomenology of emotions. And they often become internal-
ized and embodied in ever-repeated social practices and (corporate) rituals, even-
tually sedimenting themselves in a more or less rigid, alienating “emotional habi-
tus” (Illouz 2007).  
 (3) At this juncture, with the introduction of the notion of alienating feeling 
rules, we must finally turn to the third dimension of ESA: the sense in which one 
does not feel what one ought to or supposedly could feel. We have already seen 
how the normativity of emotions plays out in the affective-intentional dimension 
of emotions, and in particular concerning the appropriateness of the relation be-
tween their object and focus. Here I want to investigate the disruption of norma-
tivity with regard to the appropriateness of the relation between experiencing, 
expressing and regulating one’s emotions, on the one hand, and the enacting of 
feeling rules, on the other. 
 A straightforward way to enter this issue is by considering the discussion of 
emotional labor and management in Hochschild’s study on the commercialization 
of emotions in the service industry. Hochschild defines emotional labor as “the 
management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display; 
emotional labor is sold for a wage and therefore has ‘exchange value’” (1983, 7). 
Emotion management is performed “under the guidance of feeling rules”, rules 
that are “standards used in emotional conversation [in the wide sense of social 
exchange; T.S.] to determine what is rightly owed and owing in the currency of 
feeling” (ibid., 18). The significant point is that the appropriate measure of owing 
and ownership is not determined by oneself but by others. This is especially true 
in the context of public or professional, typically unequal and often even exploita-
tive exchange. Now, as we have already seen (sec. 1), Hochschild claims that it is 
precisely alienation that such emotional labor shares with its physical counterpart, 
and in particular the alienation from one’s emotions that one literally ‘puts to 
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work’ for the sake of others and one’s own economic survival (ibid., 7). To be 
sure, within the veritable industry of studies on emotional labor undertaken since 
the appearance of Hochschild’s classic (e.g., Bolton 2005; Guy et al. 2009; see for 
reviews Steinberg & Figart 1999; Brewer 2011), there is no unanimous consensus 
as to the psychophysical and social harms of emotional labor. Some have even 
been skeptical as to whether the affective life of individuals exercising emotional 
labor wouldn’t more robustly or altogether resist alienation (see for review Brook 
2009). Yet, most agree that there is an intimate connection between emotion 
management and emotional alienation.  
 There are various mechanisms that explain this connection: for one, we 
again have a lack of personal investment in the emotion, which results in a feeling 
of not only non-appropriation, but lack of responsibility. This resonates with 
what I analyzed above in terms of a lack of personal commitment. What takes 
precedence over personal investment is not only the instrumentally employed 
signal function of emotions and their expression (cf. Hochschild 1983, 22); as we 
have seen, an important point for Hochschild is that, in enacting emotional rules 
and conventions, the “person’s contribution of feeling (…) becomes less 
freighted with consequence” (ibid., 13). Whereas my sincere disdain and its ill-
concealed expression directed at my best friend potentially bears enormous per-
sonal significance, affecting my social life as a whole and drawing us “out from 
the sidelines”, a barista’s ill-concealed, but CCTV-recorded, disdainful looks and 
cynical remarks regarding the bad taste of a customer will likely only result in his 
being reprimanded by the shop-manager. 
 Notice also that emotional self-management is not simply a matter of artifi-
cial inducement or deliberate suppression of feelings, just as little as emotion 
management is a brute imposition of feeling rules upon emotional laborers11; 
emotion management is more subtle. Moreover, it involves one’s own doing (oth-
erwise, recall, we wouldn’t have ESA). Specifically, it involves internalized and 
bodily-incorporated emotion-regulatory processes, standards, and often even ex-
ternal ‘affective scaffolding’ (Krueger & Szanto 2017), such as make-up, uni-
forms, bodily drills, music, drugs, etc. In regulating emotions, we are “influencing 
which emotions one has, when one has them, and how one experiences and ex-
presses these emotions” (Gross 1998, 271). For example we select and adjust the 
situations of affective import and modulate our attention or behavioural respons-
es (Szanto 2017a). In alienating emotion management, ordinary regulatory pro-
cesses, however, take prevalence over any other dimension of emotions, and in 																																																								
11 Even if Hochschild herself sometimes employs formulations that suggest the contrary; cf. e.g.: 
“‘emotional labor’ [requires] one to induce or suppress feelings in order to sustain the outward 
countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” (1983, 7). 
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particular their affective-intentional one. We might call this ‘emotional overregu-
lation’.12 Here, the subject doesn’t lose all command or control over her emotion-
al life; rather, there is an all too strong command, and it is experienced as heter-
onomous. Though one still experiences the emotion as a result of one’s own per-
forming the regulatory processes, these processes themselves are not appropriated, 
but rather socially or corporately enforced. The result is a feeling of uneasiness 
with one’s own emotional labor. To put it in the language of economics: if my 
emotions owe too much to heterogeneous norms and socio-economic con-
straints, I may become unable to properly own up to them. And even if I am my 
own emotion manager, I feel as if I lose command over them. Again, my emo-
tions are still mine, in the sense that it is I who regulates them, but what is thus 
managed is not owed to myself nor owned by me. In overregulating my emo-
tions, I become their manager, but what I manage is not my own property. Para-
phrasing Goldie’s dictum, we might say that I’m not thinking with feeling but 
thinking that I should feel.13 
 
5. Concluding Remarks: What is Emotional Appropriation? 
 
I have argued that emotional self-alienation entails three interlinked dimensions: 
first, it involves a cleavage of the affective and the intentional dimensions of emo-
tions understood as felt evaluations. There is not just a gap between the (blurred) 
affective-evaluative focus and the intentional value-properties of the target; 
moreover, there is a deficient affective relation, a lack of affective impact of the 
emotion on the person having it, and furthermore a deficiency in appropriately 
integrating the evaluation into her overall evaluative outlook. Secondly, ESA in-
volves a deficiency in the self-disclosing function of emotions and accordingly 
results in disrupting personal self-elaboration. Finally, due to exceeding emotional 
labor and overregulation, ESA involves the lack of appropriating feeling rules or 
ownership and a resulting lack of personal commitment to and responsibility for 
one’s emotions. So what is the thread that connects these three deficiencies? As 
should be apparent, it is the lack of personal affective impact or involvement in 
one’s own emotions and their objects.  
 Now, even if one were to accept my argument, an inclination to protest its 
very premises and potential consequences might have been mounting all along. 
For surely, even for highly stable personalities, our personal commitments and 																																																								
12 For an interesting recent discussion of heternonomy and autonomy in regulating moral 
emotions, see Harcourt 2016. 
13 For a related interesting analysis of ESA as the gap between what I should feel, according to 
what an emotion ‘promises’, and what I actually feel, see Ahmed 2010, 42.  
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involvements change. But doesn’t the assumption of some overall evaluative out-
look militate against the rather natural idea that we develop ourselves, and value 
things, events and persons differently at different times in our life? Our world 
does not come furnished with a prefixed set of entities that matter to us, just as 
our ‘selves’ are not immobile within that world. In a similar vein, even those sym-
pathetic to Hochschild’s critical sociology of emotional commodification have 
challenged her austere distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ and the corresponding 
dichotomization of private and public selves (e.g., Wouters 1989). Even those 
who aren’t impressed by the anti-essentialist lessons from various camps of the 
poststructuralist paradigm of the “contingency of selfhood” (Rorty 1989; cf. 
Jaeggi 2005, 209-215), or feminist critiques of authenticity, must take this type of 
challenge seriously.14  
 Moreover, according to the view I have defended, isn’t the key to the ongo-
ing process of redefining ourselves and recalibrating what matters to us precisely 
to experience new or re-appropriate previous emotions? Isn’t a crucial part of 
personal self-elaboration and emotional education to adapt our emotional sensi-
tivity and dispositions to ever-changing affective environments and demands? 
This is indeed so.  
 A closely related worry seems even more devastating. Doesn’t the very con-
ception of emotional self-alienation presuppose a conception of re-appropriation, 
which inevitably rests on a dubious conception of authenticity, or the idea of 
there being some ‘private’, ‘true’, ‘natural’ or ‘self-transparent’ emotions? But 
aren’t emotions, even allegedly basic emotions, such as fear, disgust, anger, etc., 
always socio-culturally mediated, normed, co-determined or even co-
constituted—as indeed a whole generation of philosophers, psychologists, and 
sociologists, including the ones referenced here, have forcefully argued? Whereas 
the defensible answer to the first question is negative, the answer to the latter is 
straightforwardly positive.  
 I cannot here dwell on a detailed refutation of the objection to a false con-
ception of authentic emotions; nor can I dwell on elaborating the intrinsic sociali-
ty of emotions (cf. Szanto 2017a). Instead, let me gather those strands of my 
analysis that already point to why I think that the very conception of emotional 
alienation does not presuppose the idea of non-social, private or natural emotions 
or some essentialist conception of the self, and close with some brief remarks on 
what emotional self-appropriation is not. 
 First, appropriating one’s emotions ought in no way lead to endorsing some 
kind of ‘feel-yourself’ esotericism, new romanticism, or emotional self-awareness 																																																								
14 A good starting point for engaging with this, however diverse, line of criticism is to consult the 
contributions of Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, and Jonathan Lear in Honneth 2008. 
	 26 
of the sort propagated by self-help books one finds in airport bookstores with the 
author’s name followed by a suggestive ‘Ph.d.’ or ‘MD’ (cf. Illouz 2008). Recall 
that the appropriateness of emotions is an affective-intentional and normative 
matter. The appropriateness of emotions as intentional feelings of import is es-
sentially co-determined by intra-personal embeddedness (in one’s overall evalua-
tive outlook) and by their responsiveness to external evaluative warrants. Accord-
ingly, as we have seen with Scheler, Helm and Pugmire, emotional integrity and 
depth have nothing to do with some internalist construal of more ‘intensively’ 
feeling or more carefully attending to one’s own (bodily) sensations; rather they 
depend on the complex intentional relation of how my emotions cohere with one 
another and with the value-properties of the objects, events and persons revealed 
by them. Affective authenticity and emotional appropriation then means an ever-
inconclusive sensitization to one’s disposition to be affectively open to things that 
truly matter to us and that we care about. As a process of thus cultivating our 
emotions it also involves an ongoing critical reevaluation of our own emotions 
and the values revealed therein, and not least in light of other’s evaluative stances.  
 This admittedly still very abstract picture is also meant to inhibit a number 
of further misconceptions of emotional re-appropriation, notably emotional nar-
cissism, or appeals to realism or paternalism. Emphasizing and cultivating the 
self-revelatory character of emotions, or emotional self-elaboration, is not meant 
to advocate a solipsistic “inward” or “self-referential turn in emotion”. Emotions 
ought not (only) matter to me, because it is I who feels or has them, as they rever-
berate in my affective echo chamber, and in particular not if this “subverts” my 
relation to others (Pugmire 2005, 106-109). Feeling insulted by your remark about 
my behaviour should not be narcissistically inflated, as it would be were I to feel 
insulted by the mere fact that the remark is directed to me, thus eclipsing the (af-
fective) assessment of whether my behaviour in fact deserved your reprimand. 
Instead of such “emotional narcissism” (Pugmire 2005), the ineliminable self-
involvedness of emotions should not lead us to ignore the essentially relational, 
i.e. self-, other-, and world-related, dimension of emotions, nor their subject-
independent warrantability. 
 Conversely, however, this should neither support the case for some version 
of value realism, according to which there are some invariable correspondences 
or non-contextual standards for the appropriate relation between felt evaluations 
and objective value-properties. Affective import is not only deeply shaped by so-
cio-cultural, contextual factors, it is just as much determined by one’s personal 
vantage point and the place the respective emotions occupy within one’s overall 
evaluative pattern. If appropriate, emotions at the same time disclose objective 
value-properties and our own evaluative stances; moreover, they incorporate our 
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relations to our closest and more distant ‘fellow-feelers’. Consequently, a proper 
conception of emotional re-appropriation will not be vulnerable to anti-realist or 
anti-paternalistic, liberal critiques of alienation (cf. Jaeggi 2005), according to 
which the concept allegedly presupposes an invariable, objective or top-down 
determined set of socio-normative standards for having the right emotions, or 
feeling them properly. 
 Quite the contrary, emotional re-appropriation is a project that neither en-
tails a pre-given set of socio-normative emotional standards or values nor dis-
misses them in a subjectivist or internalist turn. Even if self-disclosing, authentic 
emotions will never reveal some ‘pure’ self or core of one’s personal identity that 
would be untainted by social norms and roles. The self, or personal identity, is co-
constituted by social roles. Instead of an anyway impossible retreat from social 
and public roles, then, by appropriating one’s emotions one ought to reveal those 
roles that one cares about or seeks to be expressive of oneself. To be sure, a cir-
cularity lurks here, but it is not a vicious circle, for the self-revelatory role of emo-
tions and their function to disclose values adhering to objects, events and persons 
are, as we have seen, just two correlative sides of their affective-intentional rela-
tion. But since emotions, even if self-involving and self-revelatory, are not self-
transparent (there is no direct epistemic route from an emotion to the self, as it 
were), we must always be careful and first ask, both ourselves and others, whether 
we have a case of self-deception. The mere possibility of emotional self-
deception, however, does not in principle preclude the possibility of emotional 
self-appropriation. 
 Revealing those social and public roles that one can identify with or wish to 
be expressive of oneself obviously cannot be a private enterprise; nor can it be 
achieved simply by emotional education. No ontological or existentialist project 
to re-establish emotional authenticity in a Heideggerian fashion, to combat our 
‘fallenness’ into certain everyday practices or shared emotional norms (cf. Crowell 
2015; Poellner 2015; Withy 2015; Wrathall 2015), will suffice either. Rather, what 
we need is social and institutional criticism of certain “affective arrangements” 
(Slaby et al. forthcoming) and socio-technological scaffolds (cf. Krueger & Szanto 
2017). This is a very diverse setting and accordingly a highly complex enterprise. 
It will include the ‘affective re-design’ of commercial or consumer environments, 
corporate and workplace architecture and interaction, virtual platforms (in partic-
ular dating sites, the design and use of emojis and memes), various forms of me-
dia, political and ritualistic interactions, educational practices, etc. (cf. Slaby 2017; 
Mühlhoff forthcoming). Only with appropriate institutional design and corporate 
and social practices will our unemployment agent or flight attendant be less prone 
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to experience self-alienated emotions. Their individual striving will not do alone. 
As Jaeggi suggestively puts it:  
 
If authenticity can no longer be sought in a fictitious place outside social expecta-
tions and roles, then overcoming alienation means not overcoming the sociality 
that roles represent but appropriating and transforming them. This also means 
that overcoming alienation requires the availability of social roles and institutions 
that make identification and appropriation possible. (Jaeggi 2005, 217) 
 
This will not be an easy task, but rather just as infinitely complex as our social and 
institutional realities are. But it can only get off the ground if one is clear about 
what, if anything, is deficient in emotional self-alienation. The next steps will have 
to engage in what I suggest to call a critical philosophy of emotions, and such a philos-
ophy can only be social criticism if it pays heed to the fact that our emotions, even 
the most intimately appropriated ones, are no private properties. 
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